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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the determinants of currency union membership. Geographical distance, colonial 
heritage, language, sizes and bilateral trade between two countries as predictors of their propensity 
to adopt a common currency are accounted for. To deal with endogeneity, two-step probit estimation 
method is performed. The estimation results show that geography, colonial heritage, size, and 
speaking the same language predict monetary unions quite well. However, bilateral trade does not 
enter significantly in the second-stage estimation, thus revealing that bilateral transactions between 
two countries are not a useful indicator of their membership in a common currency area. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Countries with close international trade links would benefit from a common currency and are more likely to be 
members of an optimum currency area (OCA). Thus the nature and extent of international trade is one criterium for 
EMU entry, or, more generally, membership in an OCA.” [6] 
 
s emphasized in literature at least since [9], a main advantage of joining a OCA is the reduction of 
transaction costs of trade (see also [1]). Countries that trade more with each other are more likely to 
constitute a currency union. The greater is the level of trade the higher are the savings in conversion 
costs and risks associated with different currencies. 
 
 Frankel, J. A. and Rose, A.[6] claimed that trade intensity and other OCA criteria, such as business cycles 
correlation, are jointly endogenuous. They empirically show that there is a positive correlation between bilateral trade 
and cross country correlation of business cycle activity. In analyzing the determinants of currency unions, [16] 
investigated the role of geography, cultural similarity, size, political integration, colonial origins, and synchronization 
of economic shocks. She does not take into account, however, for bilateral trade and other possible economic 
determinants of monetary unions such as GDP and per capita income. [4] estimated the probability that a “client” 
country adopts the currency of a main “anchor” country and used this likelihood as an instrument for currency areas in 
the “gravity” equation model. In their work, [1] find that both past inflation and economic shocks correlation are 
crucial for OCA membership. A country is more willing to give up its own money the higher is the inflation rate it 
experienced in the past and the greater is the business cycle correlation with the anchor. 
 
 Several studies since the seminal work of [11] (see also [5], [7], [12]) have investigated the effect of currency 
unions on trade. Almost always, these studies use a simple OLS methodology to estimate the effect of currency union 
on trade. OLS estimate, however, is biased if unmeasured characteristics, such as compatibility of legal and political 
system, cultural links, institution quality and total bilateral transfers can affect the propensity to adopt a common 
currency as well as increase bilateral trade between countries. In addition, countries that share a common currency 
might promote policies that foster integration and facilitate trade. 
 
 Both these unmeasured characteristics and the self-selection problem between trade and currency unions are 
clear cut signs that endogeneity may be present. [14] support this view. Using a panel data set spanning from 1920s to 
1930s, they find that trade among future currency area member states was already high in 1920s, and that trade 
patterns in 1920s are good predictors of monetary union membership in 1930s. 
 
 What are the determinants of monetary unions? This paper seeks to address this question using a IV 
methodology. Geography, colonial heritage, language, cultural and political similarities, and bilateral trade between 
countries are investigated as determinants of monetary unions. The reduced form equation of trade is estimated using 
A 
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the well known “gravity” equation model. The predicted values of trade from the first-stage regression are then used 
in the probit second-stage equation. The results show that, quite surprisingly, bilateral trade does not enter 
significantly in the probit model. This means that bilateral transactions between two countries are not useful predictors 
of their membership in a currency union. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the content of the dataset. Section 3 
discusses both the currency union model and the econometric methodology. The empirical results are discussed in 
section 4.  The summary ends the paper. 
 
A LOOK AT THE DATASET 
 
 The [7]’s dataset has been exploited to study the determinants of currency unions within a cross-sectional 
fashion. The analysis is performed on ten multiple of 5-year subsamples (between 1950 and 1996) extracted from the 
original dataset. The variables of interest are described below. 
 
ltradeijt is a continuous variable which measures the (log) average value of real bilateral trade between country i and 
country j in year t; 
lrgdpit is a continuous variable denoting the (log) real GDP of country i in year t; 
lrgdppcit is a continuous variable denoting the (log) real per-capita GDP of country i in year t; 
ldistij is a continuous variable which denotes the (log) great-circle distance between the capitals of country i and 
country j; 
comlangij is a binary variable indicating whether country i and country j have a common language; 
borderij is a binary variable which measures whether nation i and nation j share a border (either by land or sovereign 
waters, as recognized by international low); 
regionalijt is a binary variable that indicates whether country i and country j belong to the same regional trade 
agreement at time t; 
landlij is a dichotomous variable indicating the number of landlocked nations in the country-pair (0, 1 or 2); 
islandij is a dichotomous variable measuring the number of island nations between country i and country j (0, 1 and 2); 
lareai is a continuous variable denoting the (log) land surface of country i;  
comcolij is a binary variable that measures whether country i and country j have ever been colonized (after 1945) by 
the same colonizer; 
curcolijt is a binary variable indicating whether nation i and nation j are colonies in year t; 
colonyij is a binary variable that measures whether country i has ever been colonized by country j or vice versa; 
comnatij is a binary variable that indicates whether country i and country j have remained part of the same nation 
during the sample period; 
custrictijt is a binary variable that records whether nation i and nation j belong to the same currency union in year t. 
 
A MODEL OF CURRENCY UNIONS 
 
 Endogeneity of OCA criteria can be a problem when assessing the role of trade intensity as a determinant of 
monetary union. As mentioned above, unmeasured characteristics such as compatibility of legal and political systems, 
cultural similarities, better institutions, and tied bilateral transfers can affect the propensity to adopt a common 
currency as well as increase bilateral trade between two countries.  In addition, members of a currency area might 
promote policies that foster integration and facilitate trade.  Another source of endogeneity is the reverse causality 
problem. Namely, large level of bilateral trade may be the consequence rather than the cause of monetary union 
membership. The elimination of conversion costs and risk associated to different currencies encourages bilateral 
transactions between member states. Bilateral trade between two countries may be high ex-post, even though the level 
of trade was very low ex-ante the adoption of a common currency. 
 
 Endogeneity in classical OLS and Probit models leads to inconsistent estimates. One way to consistently 
estimate the effect of trade on currency union is by using a Two Stage Probit methodology (see, among others, [8] and 
[17] for further details).  The model can be written as follows 
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where Z1 is the matrix of exogenous variables (such as geographic distance, size, common languages, colonial 
heritage) in the probit model (1). The (log) level of bilateral trade between countries i and j, ltradeij, is the continuous 
endogenous variable and the disturbance term (u1, v2) has a zero mean bivariate normal distribution and is independent 
of the matrix of all exogenous variables, Z. The greeks  and  are parameters. (1) and (3) are the structural equations 
one wishes to estimate while (2) is the reduced-form equation for (log) level of trade. Subscripts i and j are omitted 
thereafter for ease of exposition. 
 
 Before implementing the two step procedure, the [15] test for endogeneity is performed (an alternative test is 
provided by [10]). Instruments of ltrade are needed to run the Smith-Blundell test and, eventually, the two step 
estimation. To identify them, the following standard procedure is followed. First, the reduced form expressions of 
both ltrade and custrict are estimated by OLS and probit, respectively.  Second, those variables that enter significantly 
in the OLS equation, but not into the probit equation, are eligible instruments of ltrade. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 The Smith-Blundell procedure to test exogeneity of ltrade has been implemented for each subsample year, 
from 1950 to 1997.  The null hypothesis of exogeneity of ltrade is rejected 47 times out of 48.  Only in 1953 there is 
not enough evidence against the null (see Tables 1 and 2).  This means that bilateral trade is possibly endogenous in 
(1), and two step methodology with instruments should be implemented to consistently estimate the endogenous 
variable coefficient. 
 
 
Table 1: Smith-Blundell Test For Exogeneity (1950-65) 
Year Instruments Statistic P-value 
Pooled lrgdppc 14.36 1.5e-04 
1950 island 1.91 .17 
1951 lrgdppc, island .95 .33 
1952 landl .59 .44 
1953 island .28 .6 
1954 lrgdppc .65 .42 
1955 lrgdppc .95 .33 
1956 lrgdppc, curcol 3.17 .05 
1957 lrgdppc, curcol 2.89 .09 
1958 lrgdppc .59 .44 
1959 lrgdppc, island 1.82 .18 
1960 lrgdppc, lrgdp 12.73 3.6e-04 
1961 lrgdppc, lrgdp 13.98 1.8e-04 
1962 lrgdppc, lrgdp 14.56 1.4e-04 
1963 lrgdppc, lrgdp, regional 26.25 3.0e-07 
1964 lrgdppc, lrgdp, regional 34.68 3.9e-09 
1965 lrgdppc, regional 4.15 .04 
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Table 2: Smith-Blundell test for exogeneity (1966-80) 
Year Instruments Statistic P-value 
1966 lrgdppc, regional .9 .34 
1967 lrgdppc, regional 1.13 .29 
1968 lrgdppc, regional 1.97 .16 
1969 regional 1701.79 0 
1970 regional 2243.65 0 
1971 regional 2226.69 0 
1972 colony 1.25 .26 
1973 colony 1.69 .19 
1974 lrgdppc .8 .35 
1975 regional 1.45 .23 
1976 landl 1.75 .19 
1977 colony 1.53 .22 
1978 colony .97 .32 
1979 colony 737.54 2.0e-162 
1980 colony 866.25 2.1e-190 
 
 
Table 3: Smith-Blundell test for exogeneity (1981-97) 
Year Instruments Statistic P-value 
1981 colony 1021.44 3.9e-22 
1982 colony 1136.15 4.6e-25 
1983 colony 1073.43 2.0e-23 
1984 colony 1275.11 2.9e-279 
1985 colony 1250.23 7.4e-27 
1986 colony 1345.10 1.8e-294 
1987 colony 1049.72 2.8e-230 
1988 colony 1167.68 6.5e-256 
1989 colony 1342.86 5.5e-294 
1990 colony 1145.13 5.1e-251 
1991 comctry 53.46 2.6e-13 
1992 comctry 5.74 0.166 
1993 comctry 69.61 7.2e-17 
1994 comctry 52.22 5.0e-13 
1995 comctry 56.77 4.9e-14 
1996 comctry 111.05 5.8e-26 
1997 lrgdppc 2.12 .14 
 
 
 Quite surprisingly, the suitable instruments for ltrade are time dependents. In the first subsample period, 
between 1950 and 1970, economic indicators such as the per-capita income and the GDP better instrument bilateral 
trade. Since 1970, as these variables become more correlated with currency unions, the best eligible instruments for 
bilateral trade are represented by colonial links such as colony, curcol and comctry, as reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 To estimate the determinants of currency unions the two stage estimation methodology has been performed. 
First, the reduced form equation of (2) is estimated using the well known “gravity” equation model. The predicted 
values of ltrade from the first-stage regression are then used in the probit second-stage estimation. The results are 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
 The main finding of the paper is that IV estimates of bilateral trade are not statistically significant in (1) for 
each subsample under study (see Table 4). This means that bilateral trade between countries is not a useful predictor 
of their membership in a currency union. This is in contrast with the OCA theory which states that countries with 
closer bilateral trade links would benefit more from joining a currency union. 
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Table 4: Effect of trade 
Year IV (s.e. below) 
Pooled 
.038 
.026 
1950 
-2.526 
2.099 
1955 
-.013 
.463 
1960 
-.092 
.082 
1965 
-.07 
.234 
1970 
.258 
.159 
1975 
.141 
.146 
1980 
-.025 
.153 
1985 
-.456 
.468 
1991 
.374 
.451 
1996 
.348 
.540 
 
 
Table 5: IV probit estimates of (1), (1950-65) 
Variables Pooled 1950 1955 1960 1965 
ltrade .038 
.026 
-2.526 
2.099 
-.013 
.463 
-.092 
.082 
-.070 
.234 
landl -.202 
.026 
-1.460 
1.104 
-.631 
.751 
-.185 
.231 
-.289 
.159 
island .309 
.027 
 -.109 
.48 
.15 
.19 
.266 
.192 
border -.500 
.04 
-.522 
.711 
-1.062 
.652 
-.214 
.288 
-.078 
.263 
comlang .766 
.029 
-.356 
.474 
-.405 
.406 
.338 
.174 
.490 
.179 
comcol 1.264 
.027 
3.708 
1.078 
3.060 
.587 
1.651 
.201 
1.78 
.229 
comctry .471 
.184 
  .280 
.956 
.445 
1.018 
colony 1.367 
.059 
3.880 
1.622 
2.301 
.564 
1.635 
.327 
2.146 
.418 
curcol 1.573 
.099 
8.752 
4.648 
2.700 
1.215 
1.805 
.39 
1.052 
.589 
regional -.359 
.06 
   
 
 
 
lareap .197 
.006 
-.046 
.171 
.081 
.124 
.112 
.035 
.104 
.043 
ldist -.649 
.035 
-2.503 
1.498 
-.881 
.438 
-.589 
.121 
-.623 
.211 
lrgdp -.164 
.026 
2.172 
1.666 
.232 
.39 
 .022 
.192 
lrgdppc      
intercept 4.136 
.679 
-56.850 
40.36 
-9.624 
9.264 
-.090 
1.315 
-1.182 
4.6 
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 Common colonial history and geographical characteristics of two countries are strong predictors of their 
propensity to join a currency union. The almost always negative coefficient of lrgdp means that smaller countries are 
more likely to form a currency union. 
 
 The negative sing of ldist means that geographically closer states are more prone to participate in currency 
unions. More subtle is the negative sign on the border variable. This is explained by the fact that most member 
countries are islands. Speaking the same language increases the chances for two states of belonging the same 
monetary union. The regional variable coefficient, where significant, is negative. As argued by [16], to the extent that 
free trade agreements enhance trade between member states, more open countries have a lower incentive to produce 
surprise inflation and thus they are less prone to participate in currency unions as a commitment device. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This paper studied the determinants of currency unions using a two step probit estimation methodology. It is 
shown that, geography, colonial heritage, language, cultural and political similarities are strong predictors of monetary 
unions. In contrast, bilateral trade is not statistically significant. This means that the bilateral exchanges of goods and 
services between two countries do not help to predict their membership in a common currency area.  
 
 
Table 6: IV probit estimates of (1), (1970-96) 
Variables 1970 1975 1980 1985 1991 1996 
ltrade .258 
.159 
.141 
.146 
-.025 
.153 
-.456 
.468 
.374 
.451 
.348 
.540 
landl -.170 
.136 
-.252 
.161 
-.333 
.171 
-.163 
.171 
 
 
 
 
island .281 
.161 
.570 
.168 
.562 
.168 
 
 
.104 
.218 
-.125 
.216 
border -.641 
.249 
-.494 
.252 
-.863 
.282 
-.344 
.39 
-.626 
.303 
-.718 
.455 
comlang .434 
.174 
1.024 
.205 
.977 
.213 
1.453 
.343 
1.274 
.347 
1.581 
.352 
comcol 1.342 
.184 
1.185 
.184 
1.220 
.188 
1.208 
.246 
.818 
.215 
.813 
.28 
comctry   7.214 
.067 
5.516 
2.226 
 
 
 
 
colony 1.142 
.357 
1.209 
.377 
 
 
 
 
.706 
.71 
.817 
.827 
curcol .563 
.542 
 1.439 
.118 
-.384 
1.68 
 
 
 
 
regional  
 
  
 
 
 
-1.138 
.654 
-1.267 
.597 
lareap .230 
.046 
.281 
.044 
.305 
.053 
.185 
.082 
.293 
.137 
.271 
.065 
ldist -.426 
.188 
-.429 
.197 
-.852 
.208 
-1.138 
.637 
-.338 
.58 
-.351 
.748 
lrgdp -.367 
.167 
-.333 
.156 
-.153 
.171 
.218 
.458 
-.724 
.574 
-.274 
.521 
lrgdppc  
 
  
 
.425 
.259 
 
 
.0268 
.279 
intercept 9.126 
4.363 
6.950 
4.095 
2.814 
4.419 
-10.494 
14.716 
22.200 
15.61 
22.428 
17.172 
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Table 7: Countries in sample 
Afghanistan Belgium Cape Verde 
Albania Belize Cayman Islands 
Algeria Benin Central African Rep. 
American Samoa Bermuda Chad 
Angola Bhutan Chile 
Anguilla Bolivia China 
Antigua and Barbuda Bosnia Colombia 
Argentina Herzegovina Comoros 
Armenia Botswana Congo, Dem. Rep. of (Zaire) 
Aruba Brazil Congo, Rep. of 
Australia Brunei Darussalam Costa Rica 
Austria Bulgaria Cote D’Ivorie (Ivory Coast) 
Azerbaijan Burkina Faso Croatia 
Bahamas Burma (Myanmar) Cuba 
Bahrain Burundi Cyprus 
Bangladesh Cambodia Czech Republic 
Barbados Cameroon Czechoslovakia 
Belarus Canada Denmark 
 
 
Table 8: Countries in sample (continued) 
Djibouti Gabon Hungary 
Domenica Gambia Iceland 
Dominican Rep. Georgia India 
Eastern Germany Germany Indonesia 
Ecuador Ghana Iran 
Egypt Gibraltar Iraq 
El Salvador Greece Ireland 
Equatorial Guinea Greenland Israel 
Eritrea Grenada Italy 
Estonia Guadeloupe Jamaica 
Ethiopia Guam Japan 
Faeroe Islands Guatemala Jordan 
Falkland Islands Guinea Kazakhstan 
Fiji Guinea-Bissau Kenya 
Finland Guyana Kiribati 
France Haiti Korea, North 
French Guiana Honduras Korea, South (R) 
French Polynesia Hong Kong Kuwait 
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Table 9: Countries in sample (continued) 
Kyrgyz Republic Martinique Nigeria 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Mauritania Norway 
Latria Mauritius Oman 
Lebanon Mexico Pakistan 
Lesotho Moldova Panama 
Liberia Mongolia Papua N.Guinea 
Libya Montserrat Paraguay 
Lithuania Morocco Peru 
Luxembourg Mozambique Philippines 
Macao Namibia Poland 
Macedonia Nauru Portugal 
Madagascar Nepal Qatar 
Malawi Netherlands Reunion 
Malaysia Netherlands Antilles Romania 
Maldives New Caledonia Russia 
Mali New Zealand Rwanda 
Malta Nicaragua Samoa 
Martinique Niger  
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